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FILLING THE BLA
The

Internet is 'a unique and wholly

new medium of worldwide human communication.'"'1

This pronouncement of the United

States Supreme Court echoes what most of the
American population has known for some time.
The emergence of cyberspace has dramatically
changed the nature of electronic communications, and
consumers are conducting online transactions at a tremendous pace.
While this revolution has obviously increased the amount and types of information available
to American consumers, it has also achieved a different result: businesses now have access to an
unprecedented amount of personal information. In turn, there exists a danger that this information will be used by the businesses in a way that abuses the consumer. This Note will address
the current state of the law regarding privacy of consumers' personal information, its inadequacies, and the reasons why the United States should adopt a statutory framework to regulate the
use of personal information collected by businesses.

LEGAL PROTECTION FOR
ONLINE PRIVACY
BY R. CRAIG TOLLIVER

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Imagine that you are "surfing the
Internet, one day when you come
upon a webpage that claims to have
established a large database of inforEven
mation on Internet users.
though this database operator will
eventually charge a fee for its use, it
is currently offering users a free
search of the database. Imagine further that the database claims to have
grouped information by the e-mail
addresses of users, even though it
promises to eventually assign "real"
legal names to each of these e-mail
addresses. After typing in your own
e-mail address and running a search,
you are shocked to learn that the
database has a listing of your "most
visited" Internet sites, along with
other private information such as a
compilation of many of your online
purchases and catalogue orders.
After you contact your attorney, you
are even more shocked to learn that
this type of online snooping and
information gathering is legal.
Indeed, on the Internet it seems that
nearly everything is fair game.
The Internet is a highly decentralized, global network which is unique
among communications media in the
variety and depth of personal information generated by its use. When
users browse the World Wide Web,
they leave a series of electronic markers, or "clickstream," on each site that
they visit. A website can capture certain information about users as they
enter that site. This information
includes the user's e-mail address,
the type of browser used, the type of
computer used, and the Internet
address of the site from which the
user linked to the current site.
This type of information gathering
is invisible and takes place without
the user's knowledge or consent. Of
course, users may also voluntaril disclose certain information-such as

names, addresses, and telephone
numbers-in order to access chat
rooms or register for contests. Even
voluntary disclosure carries risk,
though, as the user has no way of
knowing or controlling what happens
to the information days, months, or
even years after it is disclosed. One
common scenario is that users' personal information is aggregated and
exchanged among different marketing firms, which then target and contact potential customers.
While the privacy concern is currently quite significant, it will most
likely worsen in the future. First,
the Internet is growing at a breathtaking pace. The increase in the
number of Internet users and data
transmissions will only intensify the
Moreover,
problem.
existing
enhanced means of access to the
Internet will likely change to make
information exchange even easier,
faster, and more uncontrollable. For
example, television-ready interfaces
now allow users to obtain high-speed
access to the Internet through their
television by use of a hand-held
remote. If a user possessed a connection with a bandwidth sufficient to
allow the transmission of high quality video, she could order movies and
other programs from providers
through this connection. If successful, one would expect this merger of
television and Internet communications to generate vast new reservoirs
of information, such as the movie
preferences and viewing times of a
particular user. This would also
make many other types of information available to a potentially unlimited number of unknown third parties.
Second, an increase in the number
of Internet users is likely to generate
more Internet commerce. This translates to more online purchases and
commonplace disclosures of sensitive
data. Thus, there will be important
economic reasons to quell consumers'

fears about the privacy of their inforConsumer studies have
mation.
shown that many consumers are
wary about using the Internet
because of information privacy concerns. 2 Under current law, those
concerns are justified.
The third, and perhaps most invasive, concern is what can be termed
While
the "monitoring problem."
the user chooses what pages to visit
and what links to explore, it is the
user's computer equipment and not
the user herself who actually does
the communicating. The monitoring
problem exists because all online
communications necessarily take
place "behind the scenes." Therefore,
the user faces the unavoidable problem of not knowing exactly what
information has been provided by her
Internet browser.
At first, the monitoring problem
seems of little consequence. Most
users would rightly assume that the
producer of a commercial Internet
browser, such as Netscape or
Microsoft, would not communicate
any information unless authorized.
But most fail to realize that software
other than the main browser is
engaged during Internet communications. These additional pieces of software are commonly known as "plugins." Plug-ins can also transfer information to and from the user's computer, usually for specific purposes.
Examples of plug-ins are a stock ticker which continuously displays the
price of certain investments, a program which displays the current
weather, or a sports score updater.
With plug-ins, a single Internet
connection may begin to resemble a
busy eight-lane freeway; it is no
longer clear who, or what, is controlling the communication. Nor does
the user know exactly what information is being sent from her computer.
The Internet browser or plug-in performs this function based on the

user's commands and the data that
has been encoded in the software by
the publisher. Therefore, unlike in a
spoken conversation, the user in an
Internet communication does not
exercise direct control over the signals being sent on her behalf. If
designed properly, the browser or
plug-in could access other data
stored on the user's computer, information never intended to be disclosed to anyone.
Imagine a scenario
in which a computer
microprocessor manufacturer chooses to digitally mark each of its
with
a
processors
3
number.
code
unique
Therefore, each computer sold with that
company's processor
will have its own digiIf
tal "fingerprint."
this code number was
transmitted by Internet software,
the user's "fingerprint" would stick to
every site the user visited. Privacy
would disappear at the moment the
user goes online.

THE EXISTING LAW'S
FEEBLE PROTECTION
[Oln the Internet, new
forms of criminal activity
involving child pornography
and
pedophilia,
assumed and fraudulent
identification, sham billings and invasion of privacy are occurring at a rate
faster than legislators can
effectively devise solutions
at both the national and
state levels. Admit-tedly,
specific and detailed legislation is necessary to deal
with these crimes, but the
law frequently has resorted to broad non-specific
legislation to prevent com-

America Online (AOL), because AOL
provided her name and other personal information to another subscriber.
AOL gave out this information in
response to a subpoena served in connection with a civil lawsuit between
the plaintiff and another party,
about whom the plaintiff anonymously posted allegedly defamatory
In addition to several
material. 9
state law claims, including breach of
contract and invasion
of privacy, the plaintiff
This type of online
alleged that AOL violated the Electronic
snooping and
Communication
information gathering
Privacy Act (ECPA). 1°
is legal. Indeed, on
The plaintiff attempted
to invoke the
the Internet it
ECPA, which prohibits
seems that nearly
disclosure of the conof an electronic
tents
everything is
communication to any
fair game.
person or entity absent
the occurrence of cerHowever, the
consensus of opinion as to the most tain conditions.1 1
court found the ECPA to be inappliefficient way to achieve this end result.
On October 19, 1998, Congress cable to these facts. The statute
passed the Children's Online Privacy expressly defines "contents," as
applied to electronic communicaProtection Act, the first law aimed at
protecting online privacy. 5 This tions, to include "any information
enforcement of the Children's Online concerning the substance, purport, or
12
Privacy Protection Act was prelimi- meaning of that communication."
narily enjoined on February 1, 1999.6 The court noted that information
This law required websites to obtain concerning the name or identity of a
"verifiable parental consent for the communication's author is not procollection, use, or disclosure of per- hibited by the ECPA. 13 In fact, dis'7
closure is expressly authorized by 18
sonal information from children."
There is no comparable protection U.S.C. §2703(c)(1)(A) (1998), which states:
Except as provided in subfor adult consumers' personal inforparagraph (B), a provider
mation collected by businesses
of electronic communicathrough an online medium. Instead,
tion service or remote comCongress has left it to the private
puting service may dissector to regulate itself. When a conclose a record or other
sumer does resort to the courts to
information pertaining to
safeguard personal privacy, however,
a subscriber or customer of
she is generally left without an adesuch service (not including
quate cause of action. For instance,
the contents of communiin Jessup-Morgan v. America Online,
cations covered by subsecInc., 8 the plaintiff brought suit
tion (a) or (b) of this secprovider
her
Internet
service
against
mission with impunity
until a solution is found. 4
These words of the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania strike at the heart of
the problem. It is widely recognized
that the current state of online protections-whether statutory, common law, or self-regulation imposed
by the private sector-is insufficient
to safeguard consumer privacy.
However, there does not seem to be a

and those of private industry regulation has recently grown more pronounced as a result of the European
Union (E.U.) Council of Ministers'
Directive on Personal Data, which
18
binds all E.U. member nations.
This Directive requires that consumers must give their consent
before any information about them
may be processed by another.
Further, consumers must be told
that information is being collected,
and how it will be used. 1 9 Certain
classes of sensitive information, such
as a person's race, ethnicity, health,
sex life, and religious or political
beliefs, may not be processed. 20 In
addition, each member country must
appoint an independent government
authority to oversee the activities of
companies that process personal
information. 2 1
The most far-reaching measure of
the Directive requires that, as of
October 25, 1998, each country prohibit the transfer of information to
countries without an "adequate level
of protection." To determine whether
a country's level of protection is "adequate," the Directive considers both
the substantive rules and enforcement mechanisms of challenged
countries. The obvious implications
of this transfer prohibition have
fueled speculations of a "cyber trade
war."2 2 As of February 1999, the
E.U. and the United States had postponed the pending "war," but they
had not arrived at a satisfactory
solution to the countries' differences. 2 3 This difference can be reconciled only if (1) the American private sector voluntarily sets up an
adequate framework of protection
guidelines and enforcement mechanisms, or (2) Congress enacts legislation to govern this uncertain area.
At this time, President Clinton
STATUTORY INTERVENTION
clearly favors a market-led initiative
OR PRIVATE REGULATION?
The gap in opinion between the to protect consumers' private inforproponents of statutory enactments mation. On May 18, 1998, President

Geocities would no longer engage in
deceptive practices involving the collection or dissemination of private
consumer information, (2) Geocities
Breach of contract, breach of war- must thereafter obtain consent from
ranty, and claims of fraud can pro- parents of minors before releasing
vide some relief to consumers. The this information to any third party,
success of these claims, however, and (3) Geocities must make certain
turns on whether the Internet disclosures to its users regarding its
provider has represented that per- collection of personal information.
Specifically, Geocities must now
sonal information collected from the
subscriber will not be used for cer- disclose these matters: what infortain purposes, and yet takes actions mation is being collected; the intendinconsistent with that representa- ed use(s) of the information; the
tion. Likewise, contract or fraud types of third parties to whom it will
claims will provide little or no protec- be disclosed, whether advertisers,
tion without any express or implied mailing list companies, the public, or
others; the means by which conrepresentations of confidentiality.
Even without specific privacy leg- sumers can access their own inforTrade mation as collected; the consumer's
Federal
the
islation,
Commission (FTC) has shown a will- ability to directly remove or have
information removed from
ingness to police the collection and that
use of consumer information over the respondent's databases; and the proInternet through §5 of the FTC Act, cedures to delete personal identifywhich gives the FTC authority over ing information from Geocities' data"unfair" and "deceptive" trade prac- bases and any limitations related to
tices. 15 In the absence of a privacy such deletion.
Outside this narrow provider misstatute prohibiting certain uses of a
consumer's personal information, the representation context, the FTC is
FTC's authority will likely be without regulatory authority. This
invoked only when a provider mis- void has not been filled; legislatures
17
represents one of its privacy policies and courts have both been silent.
This lack of cases can be attributed
to a consumer.
On August 13, 1998, the FTC to two chief factors: (1) this problem
released a complaint and agreement is not serious or widespread enough
containing a consent order that illus- to prompt consumers to vindicate
trates how the FTC attempts to reg- their rights or (2) the problem may
ulate this field under its authority. be serious and widespread, but conThe agency alleged certain deceptive sumers cannot file lawsuits because
trade practices by Geocities, a they have no adequate cause of
provider and website operator. action. Developments in other counAccording to the complaint, Geocities tries demonstrate that this second
represented to consumers that the reason is at the root of the problem.
information they provided would not While American lawmakers have negbe shared with third parties, unless lected the need for online privacy, their
consumers specifically indicated an European counterparts have responded.
tion) to any person other than
a governmental entity.
On this basis, the court dismissed
14
the plaintiffs ECPA claim.

interest in that third party's prodNevertheless,
ucts or services. 16
Geocites allegedly provided this
information to third parties. The
consent order stated that (1)

Clinton stated that he and the
Japanese Prime Minister had agreed
to move forward with a "market-oriented, private-sector-led approach to
enhance privacy, protect intellectual
property, and encourage the free flow
of information and commerce on the
Internet. ' 24 And on December 1,
1998, President Clinton again
announced his intention that the
Internet be self-regulated. 2 5
The
Clinton administration has cautioned, however, that if the private
industry cannot develop "effective
privacy protection," the administration would reconsider its preference
for self-regulation. 2 6 Ira Magaziner,
senior advisor to President Clinton
on Internet issues, believes that the
United States will soon meet the
requirements of the E.U. Directive
27
through self-regulation.
The Internet industry would likely
embrace such a scheme of self-regulation. An adequate system of protection for personal information
would only increase the number of
online users and buyers. In a recent
study, non-Internet users cited their
concern over privacy as the main reason they were staying off the
Internet. 2 8 Among Internet users,
81 percent were concerned about
29
threats to their personal privacy.
This growing concern has been
reflected in the recent actions of several U.S. companies. The American
company, NCR, an international
leader in the area of data warehouse
software, has announced a set of ini-
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Despite this initiative by the private sector, international negotiations have so far failed to convince
European officials that American
safeguards can adequately secure
consumer privacy. 34 The E.U. wants
further assurances that computer
users will have the right of access to
their personal data and the right to
redress if they suffer damage because
the information is misused. 35 The E.U.
insists that an independent arbitrator
decide on such damage claims. 36 Steve
Lucas, a member of the U.S. delegation to the E.U. Directive, has noted
his "serious doubts" that the E.U.
would accept the self-regulation
schemes currently proposed by U.S.
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tiatives that will enable its clients to
meet or exceed the European Union's
privacy requirements. 3 0 According
to NCR, new features of its data
warehouse software will permit consumers to opt out of personal data
collection, obtain reports on the type
and use of data being collected, and
31
correct information already gathered.
In addition, the leading website
operators have begun an online campaign to promote personal privacy on
the Internet. 3 2 These website operators-America
Online,
Excite,
Infoseek, Lycos, Netscape, Snap, and
Yahoo! together claim to reach nine
out of ten Internet users. Their campaign hopes to encourage companies
to adopt such privacy policies as
revealing their use of personal data
and obtaining the prior consent of
33
individual users.
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business groups.
Opponents of statute-based privacy protections argue that the concerns of consumers can be handled
most effectively by private industry.
These opponents rely principally on
the "laissez-faire" belief that the
government should not interfere in
areas of the economy that can be
regulated through private initiative. Despite this argument, several
factors tip the scales in favor of a
statutory scheme.

A STATUTORY SCHEME
MAKES SENSE
The first reason for a statutory
solution concerns the manner in
which the user's privacy is invaded.
Often, personal information about
consumers is taken without their
knowledge. A consumer may never
know that a certain website has
taken information and distributed it
to third parties. Only when consumers know that they have been
harmed can they effectively address
their concerns with "watchdog"
groups or pursue legal remedies. But
when the harm is dealt without witness or awareness, the single consumer or small group can hardly pursue these companies secretly violating industry standards.
If the appropriate guidelines were
statutory, however, and enforceable
by an agency such as the FTC,
providers would be much more reluctant to exploit the unaware. The FTC
would be in a far better position to
investigate
Aalleged
violations and file
complaints
against
providers that
violate consumer
privacy statutes.
A second reason for a statu-

tory scheme, related to the first, is expense of such litigation would like- vately initiated protection system,
the inefficiency of the enforcement ly discourage consumers from bring- with a toothless enforcement entity,
mechanism behind a privately initi- ing contract-based claims against will inspire such confidence in consumers.
ChilThe
privacy
ated
dren's Online
standard.
Protection Act
Consumers must have
Without a legof 1998 procon fidence in their onl ine
islative answer,
muchvides
it is unclear
needed protecet
Intern,
the
for
ivacy
pr
remedy
what
the
to
tion
to
consumers
reach its full potenti al.
of
perintegrity
could seek in
A privately initiated
sonal informathe event of a
"violation" by a
tion about chilpr otection system, with a
dren. Children
provider. This
toothless enforcement
are incapable of
difficulty stems
en
from the nature
of the Internet
itself. Because
the Internet is
so decentralized, its agility allows
and even encourages users to rapidly
jump between "links" on webpages to
display pages that are stored on different computers owned by different
businesses. In addition, an Internet
user usually has several different
connections open at the same time.
For example, a user may be viewing
one page while he or she is simultaneously exchanging information with
another entity, such as an advertisement found on the webpage currently displayed. As technology and connection speeds advance even further,
it is likely that the number and
nature of simultaneous connections
will increase dramatically. Industry
protections could hardly keep up.
Any private enforcement mechanism would have to be contractually
based to create some representation
of privacy on behalf of the website.
However, it would be impractical and
inefficient for an Internet user to digitally "sign" an information use
agreement with every entity with
whom information is exchanged.
Even if this were possible, a challenging provider could litigate a myriad of issues relating to the validity
of the contract with the user. The

tity, will not inspi re

such confidence.
providers. Therefore, Internet users
would be resigned to browse without
protest as they are exploited by
online entities.
By analogy, these concerns resemble similar consumer-based concerns
that were remedied by passage of the
38
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

m a k i n g

informed and
intelligent
choices about
the information that should be provided to online operators. Adults are in a
very similar situation as they have no
way of knowing when information is
As a result,
being collected.
Congress should also extend consumer information protection to the
entire public.

The purpose of that Act was to eliminate abusive debt collection prac- LEGAL INGREDIENTS FOR
tices. 3 9 The Fair Debt Collection MAKING NEW LAW
The only law that Congress has
Practices Act gave consumers a readin this area is the Children's
enacted
ily available means to vindicate their
rights against businesses which took Online Privacy Protection Act of
advantage of them, very similar to 1998. Section 1303(a)(1) states:
It is unlawful for an operathe purposes that would be served by
tor of a website or online
an online privacy protection law.
service directed to chilprotectJust as consumers should be
dren, or any operator that
ed from unfair leverage in a debt colhas actual knowledge that
lection situation, they should also be
it is collecting personal
protected in cyberspace, where powinformation from a child,
erful companies build the machines,
to collect personal inforprogram the software, and control
mation from a child in a
the networks.
manner that violates the
A third factor that compels a
prescribed
regulations
statutory scheme is consumer confi(b). 4 0
subsection
under
for
dence in online privacy. In order
Section 1303(b) then provides
the Internet to reach its full potential
within a year from enactment,
that,
as a medium of interstate commerce,
consumers have to be reassured the Federal Trade Commission must
about the level of privacy that they provide regulations which establish
will enjoy. It is unlikely that a pri- certain safeguards. Those regula-

tions must require the website oper- of the information, allowing the user lenge exploitative collection. The difators to post notices that they collect
ficult task is to design legislation
to verify the information and correct
46
information from children; obtain any errors.
which puts consumers on a level
verifiable parental consent for the
The proposed Communications playing field with the online busicollection, use, or disclosure of per- Privacy and Consumer Empower- nesses. Ideally, online businesses
sonal information; and maintain rea- ment Act called for FTC rules that should be prohibited from taking
sonable internal policies and guide- mandated
that
consumers
be "personal" information from conlines with respect to information informed that information is being sumers without their knowledge.
gathering. Section 1303(c) treats a collected about them, that users
But this is not as simple as it
violation of this Act as an unfair or receive conspicuous notice that the sounds. First, Congress must predeceptive practice
cisely
define
"personal
inforprescribed under
§18(a)(1)(B) of the
mation."
Any
Unlike face-to-face
Federal
Trade
definition will
conversations,
C o m mis sio
n
most likely conthe Internet involveE
Act. 4 1
States
tain
ambiguimay also bring
ties.
It would
communications betwee n
actions, pursuant
not be prudent
visible parties who Eire
to ban the colto §1305(a)(1), in
order to recover
lection of every
iot actually exercisirig
damages suffered
type of informaDntrol over all aspec t s
tion because the
by residents of
C)f their communicatior71.
that state as a
Internet necesresult of any viosarily requires
lation of an FTC
transmissions of
regulation
promulgated
under collected information could be used certain data as part of every commu§1303.42
The remedies available or sold to a third party, and that nication. For example, every connecunder the Act include both injunctive providers "exercise control over the tion requires a commercial operator
43
relief and damage awards.
collection of personal information to identify the computer network
Other than this Act, several bills
have been introduced into Congress
that recognized the need for statutory protections of consumers' private
information. Though these proposals
never became law, they nevertheless
suggest increasing legislative support for a comprehensive statute.
The proposed Data Privacy Act
called for the online computer industry to enact certain guidelines to protect consumers. 4 4 Under its provisions, the providers would notify the
user that information is being collected, the nature of that information, and that the user has the option
to prohibit disclosure of the information. 45 This notice would be provided
before or at the same time the data is
collected. At the request of the user,
the providers must further provide a
description of third party recipients

and to stop the unauthorized use,
reuse, disclosure or sale of that information."4 7 The proposed act also
contained findings of fact. One such
finding stated that further protections are needed to ensure that consumers' rights are "retained and
respected" by other entities doing
business in cyberspace. 48 The proposed Act also estimated that some
five million young Americans used
the Internet and that this number
49
was expected to triple by the year 2000.

from which a user has connected so
that responses can be sent to the correct part of the Internet. This type of
identifying information must be collected.
In contrast, an operator would
have little, if any, justification for
extracting information which is
stored on the user's computer. One
response may be to draft language
allowing operators to collect, without
the user's consent, only information
"necessary and vital to the operation

Before enacting online consumer
protection legislation, Congress must
first decide what exactly is to be protected. On one hand, it is vital to the
functioning of the Internet that businesses be able to collect information
from consumers. On the other hand,
the individual consumer lacks the
awareness and resources to chal-

of Internet communications and
the common protocols which are
embodied therein." This language
is still broad but could be effectively
narrowed by rules and regulations
promulgated by an agency having
jurisdiction over the execution of
the law, such as the FTC, or by
judicial interpretation.

A second hurdle to uniform legislation is the presence of "limited-purpose information." This data the consumer has willingly supplied to a
commercial operator for a limited
transaction, such as credit card information, names, addresses, telephone
numbers, e-mail addresses, and the
like. This supply of information,
however, should not enable commercial operators to further appropriate
the information for purposes beyond
the scope of the original transmission. The statute should establish
guidelines requiring commercial
operators to obtain consent from the
users for any non-implied uses of the
information, or, alternatively, grant
the FTC jurisdiction to promulgate
its own guidelines. Because of the
ephemeral nature of the medium,
there will most likely be evidentiary
disputes over whether the user, for
example, clicked the "Yes" button to
allow the operator to use her information in a certain manner. For this
reason, the guidelines should require
the operators to obtain consent
through a somewhat more stable
forum, such as an e-mail from the user.
Another wildcard concerns the
federal agency which should be given
enforcement authority over the
terms of an Internet privacy law. It
is unlikely that existing knowledge of
the relationship between consumers
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and commercial entities will be sufficient to allow any agency to understand the dynamics of the cyberspace
environment. Unlike television and
radio, the Internet is a two-way communication that may not be occurring on a large scale environment.
And, unlike face-to-face conversations, the Internet involves communications between invisible parties
who, as already discussed, are not
actually exercising control over all
aspects of their communication.
Therefore, it may be appropriate to
develop another administrative division, such as a Department of the
Internet (DOI), which may exercise
its authority from within a parent
organization, such as the FTC or
FCC. Much akin to the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department,
the DOI would contain a staff of
experts who would enforce Internet
regulations and promulgate rules on
behalf of the FTC or FCC. The DOI
division would be able to respond to
rapidly developing, complex Internet
issues, something the FTC or FCC,
as a whole, may not be able to do.
The world of cyberspace is, in
some respects, similar to the business world that we all inhabit and
It
create with every transaction.
revolves around the transfer of information between parties. In many
other respects, however, cyberspace
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is dramatically different.
Once
online, one cannot monitor the
behavior of the parties with whom
one deals; indeed, one cannot even
monitor the behavior of one's own
agent, the computer. This lack of
awareness and control leaves the
consumer vulnerable, without the
incentive or even ability to guard
against exploitation by others.
The explosion in popularity and
utility of the Internet has created the
unique world of cyberspace. Not surprisingly, the creation of this new
forum has also brought equally
unique and unforeseen problems.
Consumers are adrift in this strange
new universe and cannot be expected
to defend themselves, using technology they may not understand,
against predators they cannot fully
perceive. Congress should act now,
before the nation becomes even more
dependent on online communications. The government must protect
consumers from the biggest black
hole in cyberspace-the consumption
and misuse of personal information. *
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